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17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
18 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

19 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
20 COMMISSION,

21 Plaintiff,

22 v.

23 PLUS MONEY, INC. and MATTHEW LA
24 MADRID,

25 Defendants,

26 THE PREMIUM RETURN FUND LIMITED-
27 LIABILITY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET
28 AL.,

Relief Defendants.

Case No. 3:08cv-0764 BEN (NLS)

**OPPOSITION OF STEPHEN, J. DONELL,
RECEIVER, TO DEFENDANT MATTHEW
LA MADRID'S MOTION TO STAY CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS PENDING RESOLUTION
OF CRIMINAL ACTION**

Date: August 11, 2008
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Ctrm: 3

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

Stephen J. Donell (the "Receiver"), the court-appointed Permanent Receiver for Defendant Plus Money, Inc. and Relief Defendants The Premium Return Fund Limited-Liability Limited Partnership, The Premium Return Fund II Limited-Liability Limited Partnership, The Premium Return Fund III Limited-Liability Limited Partnership, Return Fund, LLC, Return Fund II, LLC,

1 Return Fund III, LLC, Return Fund IV, LLC, Return Fund V, LLC, Return Fund VI, LLC, and
2 their subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively with Plus Money, Inc., the "Receivership Entities")
3 hereby opposes Defendant Matthew La Madrid's ("La Madrid" or "Defendant") Motion to Stay
4 Civil Proceedings Pending Resolution of Criminal Action (Defendant's "Motion") to the extent a
5 stay is sought with respect to any of the rights, powers, or duties of the Receiver. Defendant
6 apparently seeks to stay the entirety of the above-captioned action until such time as criminal
7 proceedings against Defendant – which do not yet exist – are concluded, despite the fact that the
8 Motion is devoid of any basis for staying the rights, powers or duties of the Receiver.
9 Furthermore, a stay affecting the Receiver represents an untimely attempt – by a consenting
10 party – to reconsider the orders of this Court as regards the appointment of the Receiver. For the
11 foregoing reasons, the Receiver respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion, at
12 least to the extent it seeks to stay any of the rights, powers, or duties of the Receiver.

13 **I. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND.**

14 The above-captioned action was commenced on April 28, 2008 when the United States
15 Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") filed its Complaint against La Madrid
16 and other defendants and relief defendants. On May 16, 2008, this Court entered its Preliminary
17 Injunction and Order: (1) Freezing Assets; (2) Appointing a Permanent Receiver; (3) Requiring
18 Accountings; and (4) Prohibiting the Destruction of Documents (the "Appointment Order"),
19 pursuant to which the Receiver was appointed as a permanent receiver and charged with, among
20 other things, assuming control over the Receivership Entities and their assets, performing an
21 accounting of the assets and financial condition of the Receivership Entities, investigating,
22 locating, and recovering any outstanding Receivership Entity assets, preparing reports for the
23 Court, and preparing an appropriate claim allowance and investor/creditor distribution plan. La
24 Madrid consented to the appointment of the Receiver and consented to the Court's entry of the
25 Appointment Order in its entirety.

26 Immediately upon the entry of the Appointment Order, the Receiver assumed control over
27 the Receivership Entities, and commenced his efforts to recover the business and financial records
28 of the Receivership Entities, and to account for and assume control over all assets of the

1 Receivership Entities. (*See* Declaration of Stephen J. Donell (hereinafter "Donell Decl.") ¶ 3.) As
 2 of the date of this Opposition, the Receiver and his professionals (including his accountants and
 3 counsel) have recovered numerous computers used by the Receivership Entities, recovered and
 4 reviewed Receivership Entity documents and financial records, served multiple subpoenas upon
 5 persons or entities in possession of additional Receivership Entity documents and records, and
 6 begun the recovery of Receivership Entity assets, including funds held by non-party financial
 7 institutions. (Donell Decl. ¶ 4.) The Receiver's efforts are ongoing and incomplete, and
 8 significant additional work is required. (*Id.*)

9 On July 7, 2008, Defendant filed his Motion, requesting that the Court stay the entirety of
 10 the above-captioned action pending the resolution of potential – but as yet nonexistent – criminal
 11 claims against him. As of the date of this Opposition, no criminal charges have been filed against
 12 Defendant in connection with the above-captioned matter. Defendant's Motion is seemingly
 13 directed only at the Commission as a plaintiff and himself as a defendant. It does not address the
 14 receivership aspects of this case in any fashion, and none of its arguments are directed at the
 15 Receiver or the Appointment Order.

16 On July 10, 2008, the Receiver's counsel contacted Defendant's counsel, requesting that
 17 Defendant confirm that his Motion sought to stay only the prosecution of the above-captioned
 18 action against La Madrid, personally, and did not seek to stay the receivership aspects of this case.
 19 (*See* Declaration of Joshua A. del Castillo (hereinafter "del Castillo Decl.") ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Defendant
 20 and his counsel failed to provide such a confirmation, responding instead that the scope of the stay
 21 was for the Court to decide. (del Castillo Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2.)

22 Defendant's Motion fails to discuss, in any way, the receivership aspects of this case. As a
 23 result, and out of an abundance of caution, the Receiver hereby opposes Defendant's Motion.
 24 Defendant seeks to stay – apparently – the entirety of this proceeding¹ based upon the potential
 25 that he may face criminal charges stemming from the same conduct underlying this case, and that
 26 – if and when those charges are brought – he may have to choose between testifying in one action

27 _____
 28 ¹ The Receiver respectfully submits that Defendant's failure to confirm that his Motion seeks to
 stay only the prosecution of the above-captioned action against him, personally, and not the
 entirety of this proceeding, reflects his amenability to a blanket stay.

1 and exercising his right against self incrimination in another. Put simply, the possibility that
2 Defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right may become an issue at some unspecified time
3 in the future is an insufficient basis for him to request that the receivership aspects of this case be
4 stayed.

5 The Receiver's charge is such that it cannot be readily and indefinitely suspended without
6 seriously compromising the results of his efforts, and the ultimate distribution of funds to investors
7 or creditors. The Receiver's work – assuming control over the Receivership Entities; performing
8 an accounting; investigating, locating, and recovering outstanding Receivership Entity assets;
9 preparing reports for the Court; and preparing claim allowance and distribution plans – is time-
10 sensitive, and any delay resulting from a stay affects the ability of the Receiver to effectively carry
11 out his responsibilities and would impact his ability to recover funds and make distributions to
12 investors and creditors. A stay of this proceeding is completely inappropriate for the receivership
13 aspect of this case. Further, contrary to Defendant's position, staying the entirety of this matter
14 will severely prejudice the interests of non-party investors in the Receivership Entities. Absent the
15 Receiver's ability to identify, account for, locate, and recover Receivership Entity assets, no
16 distributions to investors can be made.

17 Finally, Defendant did not challenge the appointment of the Receiver, nor the Court's
18 Appointment Order articulating the Receiver's responsibilities. Defendant should not be allowed
19 to seek a *de facto* reconsideration of the Appointment Order at this time.

20 For the foregoing reasons, the Receiver therefore respectfully requests that the Court deny
21 Defendant's Motion.

22 **II. ARGUMENT.**

23 **A. Defendant's Motion Is Overbroad And Unwarranted As To The Receiver.**

24 Defendant takes no position in his Motion on whether his request for a stay is limited to the
25 Commission's claims against him personally, or to the entirety of the above-captioned case.
26 Indeed, Defendant's Motion remains totally silent on the issue. A subsequent communication from
27 La Madrid's counsel likewise took no position – despite a specific request that the scope and intent
28 of the Motion be clarified. The Receiver is therefore put in the unenviable position of having to

1 respond to the Motion without a clear understanding of what, specifically, the Motion seeks to
2 stay. Taken at face value, Defendant's Motion appears to request – improperly and without basis –
3 that the Court stay the entirety of this proceeding. As such, the Motion is overbroad, and should
4 be denied, at least as to the receivership aspects of the case.

5 As Defendant's own cited authority notes, the Constitution does not require a stay of civil
6 proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. *Keating v. Office of Thrift Servs.*, 45
7 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1994); *see also SEC v. Dresser Indus.*, 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir.
8 1980). Further, "[t]he case for staying civil proceedings is 'a far weaker one' when '[n]o
9 indictment has been returned[, and] no Fifth Amendment privilege is [immediately] threatened.'"
10 *FSLIC v. Molinaro*, 889 F.2d 899, 903 (quoting *Dresser Indus.*, 628 F.2d at 1376)); *see also*
11 *Walsh Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Property Mgmt., Ltd.*, 7 F.Supp.2d 523, 528 (D. N.J. 1998) ("[P]re
12 indictment requests for a stay are generally denied."). Finally, "[a] defendant [complaining of a
13 potential risk to his right against self-incrimination] has no absolute right not to be forced to
14 choose between testifying in a civil matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege."
15 *Keating*, 45 F.3d at 326. Indeed, it is unquestionably permissible "to conduct a civil proceeding at
16 the same time as a related criminal proceeding, even if that necessitates the invocation of the Fifth
17 Amendment privilege." *Id.* (emphasis added).

18 Defendant's cited authority suggests that only under specific circumstances – where a
19 criminal indictment has issued or is certain and a defendant is faced with the prospect of having to
20 choose between invoking his right against self-incrimination and mounting an aggressive defense
21 – should a stay even be considered. This is not the case here, and there are unquestionably other
22 factors to consider. The bulk of Defendant's argument in the Motion rests upon the assumption
23 that there are only two parties of relevance to this litigation – La Madrid and the Commission –
24 and thus that a stay imposed by the Court pending the resolution of possible criminal proceedings
25 against La Madrid would not compromise the goals of this case. This assumption is incorrect, and
26 the standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit in *Keating* favors denying Defendant's Motion as to
27 the receivership aspect of this case.

28

Specifically, where a defendant seeks a stay of a civil action pending the resolution of a related, criminal matter, on the basis that his Fifth Amendment rights may be compromised, a District Court should consider the following factors in deciding whether – and to what extent – to impose a stay: (1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the subject litigation and the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose upon a defendant; (3) the convenience of the court and efficient management of its resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil action; and (5) the interest of the public. *Keating*, 45 F.3d at 324-25.

As discussed below, Defendant's Motion fails to address each of the Keating factors, and the existence of other parties in this matter, including interested third parties whose interests will necessarily be affected by a blanket stay, militates against granting Defendant's overbroad Motion.

1. A Stay Of This Proceeding Would Compromise The Receiver's Efforts And The Interests Of Investors In the Receivership Entities.

Defendant's Motion is based upon his assertion that he may face criminal charges stemming from the conduct underlying this matter, and that – as a result – he may be forced to choose between testifying in his own defense in this matter and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege in a prospective criminal proceeding. The Motion is therefore predicated upon a double contingency, neither part of which is certain at this point. Worse, the Motion directly addresses only two of the *Keating* factors – prejudice to the Commission and the burden potentially faced by Defendant – and fails to address the remaining factors identified by the *Keating* court.

As noted above, there are more than two parties to this matter. La Madrid is one among a host of defendants and relief defendants – many of whom have assets sought to be recovered by the Receiver pursuant to the Appointment Order. As a consequence, a blanket stay of this matter would necessarily affect – indeed, as described below – actually prejudice the interest of other parties to this litigation, and would unquestionably compromise the interests of investors/creditors of the Receivership Entities.

Pursuant to Section VI of the Appointment Order, the Court has charged the Receiver with, among other things, assuming control over the Receivership Entities and their assets, performing

1 an accounting of the assets and financial condition of the Receivership Entities², and investigating,
 2 locating, and recovering preserving any outstanding Receivership Entity assets. These tasks
 3 cannot be readily and indefinitely suspended without compromising the results of the Receiver's
 4 efforts. By example, the Receiver's ability to investigate, locate, recover, and preserve outstanding
 5 or unaccounted for Receivership Entity assets would necessarily be compromised by a blanket
 6 stay of this matter, actually rendering it impossible for the Receiver to pursue those efforts, and
 7 potentially putting an eventual recovery of Receivership Entity assets at risk.

8 Each of the Receiver's responsibilities under the Appointment Order is necessarily time-
 9 sensitive, and any delay heightens the possibility that Receivership Entity assets may be dissipated
 10 or otherwise rendered unrecoverable. This, in turn, would reduce the amount of funds available, if
 11 any, for distribution to investors in the Receivership Entities at the conclusion of the case.

12 **B. Defendant's Motion Requests More Relief Than Is Warranted Given His**
 13 **Stated Concerns.**

14 It is well recognized that a receiver is the agent only of the court appointing him; he
 15 represents the court rather than the parties. Ledbetter v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 142 F.2d 147,
 16 150 (4th Cir. 1944). As a result, the Receiver's responsibilities under the Appointment Order are,
 17 in a practical sense, independent of the Commission's claims against La Madrid or any criminal
 18 investigation being undertaken by the United States Attorney's Office or any other entity.

19 A blanket stay of these proceedings is therefore unnecessary. As noted above, staying the
 20 entire action would hinder the Receiver's ability to locate and recover critical information and
 21 Receivership Entity assets, and could provide parties in possession of such information or assets
 22 with an opportunity to hide evidence or dissipate assets. To the extent that the Court determines
 23 that La Madrid should not face a choice between testifying in his own defense in this matter and
 24 invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege in a prospective criminal proceeding, the Court need only
 25 stay the taking of contemporary, testimonial discovery from La Madrid. The Receiver's
 26 investigation – including the recovery of Receivership Entity documents and records – does not
 27

28 ² Indeed, the Receiver's Initial Report and Petition for Further Instructions must be filed with the
 Court by July 30, 2008.

1 implicate Defendant's Fifth Amendment Privilege where it does not require him to provide
2 contemporary testimony.³

3 To the extent that Defendant's Motion purports to attempt to safeguard his right against
4 self-incrimination, the Motion is, again, overbroad. A blanket stay is unnecessary and would be
5 excessive, given the less-restrictive alternative of staying the taking of contemporary, testimonial
6 discovery from La Madrid. As a result, the Receiver respectfully requests that the Court deny the
7 Motion as overbroad, or tailor any stay so as to protect Defendant's rights while allowing the
8 Receiver to continue with his responsibilities.

9 **C. Defendant's Motion Represents An Untimely Motion To Reconsider The**
10 **Appointment Order.**

11 The Court entered the Appointment Order on May 16, 2008. No objections – either from
12 La Madrid or any other party – were made. As discussed above, Section VI of the Appointment
13 Order charges the Receiver with assuming control over the Receivership Entities and their assets,
14 performing an accounting of the assets and financial condition of the Receivership Entities, and
15 investigating, locating, and recovering preserving any outstanding Receivership Entity assets.
16 These efforts were already well underway at the time Defendant filed his Motion – nearly two
17 months after the Court entered the Appointment Order.

18 Given Defendant's apparent intent to trigger a blanket stay of these proceedings, including
19 upon the receivership aspects of the case, Defendant's Motion can be accurately characterized as a
20 *de facto* motion for reconsideration – an attempt to have the Court revisit (and indeed effectively
21 rescind) the Appointment Order. Such an effort must not be countenanced. Reconsideration is an
22 extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly, and courts routinely refuse to hear argument or
23 evidence that could have been presented at the original hearing. *Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of*
24
25

26 ³ An individual defendant is not permitted to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect
27 to the records of a collective entity, such as a corporation. *See In re Grand Jury Subpoena*,
28 383 F.3d 905, 910 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing *Wilson v. United States*, 221 U.S. 361, 380
(1911)). The production of Receivership Entity documents, computers, and other materials
containing historical statements therefore does not implicate Defendant's right against self-
incrimination.

1 *Bishop*, 229 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); *Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas, Ltd.*, 52 F.3d 1220,
 2 1231 (3d Cir. 1995).

3 Here, Defendant knew – well before the Appointment Order was submitted to or approved
 4 by the Court – that the conduct underlying this case could be a focus for criminal proceedings as
 5 well. (*See* Declaration of Joseph Casas in Support of Motion to Stay Civil Proceedings Pending
 6 Resolution of Criminal Action ¶ 4) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the behest of the Assistant
 7 United States Attorney, executed search warrant in connection with ongoing criminal investigation
 8 of La Madrid.) Nonetheless, Defendant raised no Fifth Amendment (or other) concerns in
 9 connection with the appointment of the Receiver, nor did he object to the Receiver's
 10 responsibilities as identified in Section VI of the Appointment Order. The Court must not revisit
 11 the Appointment Order two months after the fact merely because Defendant has raised what
 12 amounts to a hypothetical concern over discovery.

13 **III. CONCLUSION.**

14 For the foregoing reasons, the Receiver respectfully requests that this Court deny
 15 Defendant's Motion, and allow the receivership aspect of this case to proceed.

16 Dated: July 25, 2008

17 By: /s/ David L. Osias

18 DAVID L. OSIAS
 19 JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO
 20 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE
 21 MALLORY & NATSIS LLP
 22 Attorneys for Receiver
 23 Stephen J. Donell
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 501 West Broadway, 15th Floor, San Diego, California 92101-3541.

On July 25, 2008, the foregoing document (and accompanying declarations) were served via NEF notice to the following parties who are registered ECF filers in this case:

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In addition, copies were served on the following by placing a true copy thereof in sealed envelope(s) addressed as stated below and depositing in the U.S. Mail at San Diego, California:


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I am readily familiar with this firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than 1 day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made and that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 25, 2008, at San Diego, California.

Catherine A. Schiaffo
(Type or print name)


(Signature)